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Climate Change and Human Security: The International Governance 
Architecture, Policies and Instruments 
 
Michael Mason 
 
 
Other chapters in this volume set out the multiple threats posed by climate change to 
human security. Without restating these claims here, it is nevertheless useful to remind 
ourselves that a prominent theme concerns how human security framings recast the idea 
of climate change as a development-oriented rather than environmental challenge. 
According to this approach, the dangers of climate change reside less in the incidence and 
magnitude of (predicted) biophysical events than in their apprehension as threats to 
human well-being, particularly for the poor and disadvantaged. The human security lens 
invites us to view climate change in a people-centred way, admitting it as only one of a 
number of conditions of life which may in practice jeopardise opportunities for safe, 
dignified and inclusive human development. What can be readily acknowledged is that 
there are diverse trajectories of climate-related influence on human lives and livelihoods, 
though it is the severe stress on vulnerable peoples attributed to present and future 
climate change that has justified its ‘human securitisation’. 
 
This chapter examines the disparate architectures, policies and instruments drawn on in 
efforts to conjoin climate change and human security governance. The institutional 
starting-point is not promising: Held (2010, pp. 185-88) pinpoints the ‘paradox’ of global 
governance as the chronic mismatch between, on the one hand, the growing cross-border 
scope and intensity of collective problems - including transnational security and 
environmental risks - and, on the other, weak problem-solving capacities at international 
and regional levels. He ascribes the key shortcomings here to a multilateral order, still 
bearing the institutional imprint of a mid-twentieth century geopolitical settlement, not yet fit 
for purpose in our times. As noted below, neither climate change nor security are 
consensual domains for global governance. Both are dominated by state-centred decision-
making which prioritises national interests over human well-being: the international 
security system features enduring schisms over conflict prevention and management, 
while there are also significant disagreements between states concerning the ambition of 
international action on climate change. Conjoined governance addressed to 
‘environmental security’ or ‘climate security’ might be expected to compound the 
institutional indeterminacy here. However, there is also the possibility that such a 
convergence could instead offer the prospect of coordinated action integrating diverse 
policy communities (Barnett et al., 2010, pp. 9-10). This, at least, is acknowledged within 
the United Nations (UN) system, where, as we shall see, explicit governance connections 
have been made between human security and climate change. 
 
The first half of the chapter reviews those limited global governance policies and 
instruments recruited to address the human security implications of climate change. This 
involves both a survey of the emergence of human security concerns within global climate 
governance - notably the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) - and 
the recognition by some security governance actors that climate-related harm represents a 
significant threat to the lives and livelihoods of many people. Reference is made to several 
governance initiatives to determine whether there is anything other than scattered 
institutional moves to enhance human security against major climate hazards. In the 
second half of the chapter, I switch to a normative analysis of whether a more integrated 
governance to this end is justified and, if so, what it might look like. There are systemic 
obstacles to the clustering of human security and climate change decision-making. Even if  
  
operational concerns can be allayed, it would be rash to suggest more than general 
principles of institutional design which may be appropriate. I argue that, while the global 
climate regime holds epistemic and governance authority over the management of 
‘dangerous’ climate change, the effective inclusion of climate concerns in human security 
decision-making is most likely to be achieved by consolidating the legal coherence and 
force of the latter - especially in relation to the development of human rights and 
humanitarian norms on the prevention of climate harm. Such a rights-based architecture 
would also afford human security governance at least some protection from, and critical 
engagement with, the power-oriented politics of the international security system. 
 
 
GOVERNING CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN SECURITY: REGIME INDETERMINACY 
 
There is no fixed institutional site for international rule-making on climate change as a 
threat to human security. What I characterise in this section as ‘regime indeterminacy’ 
denotes the absence of an agreed institutional authority or forum for addressing climate 
change and human security in an integrated manner. As will be shown below, while 
human security is now acknowledged as a legitimate governance issue within the 
international climate regime, this has not yet led to any formal policy decision by the 
UNFCCC to protect or enhance human security in the context of climate change. Similarly, 
climate change is recognised as a serious threat to well-being within various global 
initiatives on human security, but its incorporation into these nascent governance 
mechanisms is ad hoc and uncertain. 
 
Since its signing in 1992, the UNFCCC has served as the key instrument for global rule-
making on climate change. Global climate governance is generally cooperative, but away 
from the UNFCCC, heterogenous and fragmented - encompassing related treaties (e.g. 
Montreal Protocol), transnational municipal networks, subnational actors, bilateral or club 
agreements and corporate climate initiatives (Biermann et al., 2010; Keohane and Victor, 
2011). The near-universal membership of the climate change convention reveals the 
shared agreement of states that action is necessary to prevent ‘dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system’ (UNFCCC, Article 2), although the history of the 
treaty regime attests to enduring differences between Parties over appropriate 
responsibilities and commitments. To achieve global climate stabilization at safe levels, the 
UNFCCC has focused on mitigation actions, notably cuts in greenhouse gas emissions, 
Binding commitments to reduce emissions had to await the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (in force 
since 2005), which placed differentiated obligations on industrialised countries who ratified 
the agreement (excluding of course the United States). Even the modest Kyoto targets for 
2008-2012, well short of the emissions reductions deemed necessary by the 
Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC), were only partially met. By 2012, 
UNFCCC negotiations to secure a more comprehensive and deeper reductions had 
resulted in voluntary commitments from all major emitting countries but no new legally 
binding agreement. The tortuous progress of the UN climate treaty regime has led to 
increasing calls for a more decentralised system of global climate decision-making. Taking 
note of the myriad of climate governance initiatives outside the UNFCCC process, the 
argument is that a loosely coordinated, flexible approach will facilitate innovative, 
ambitious measures that, tailored to specific sectors or regions, can bypass barriers to 
global collective action (e.g. Falkner et al., 2011, Hoffmann, 2011; Victor, 2011). 
 
It is not necessary here to engage with the debate on the appropriate architecture for 
global climate governance, except to note that the idea of human security barely registers 
in the competing blueprints for institutional renewal or reform. Both the UNFCCC and 
  
Kyoto Protocol contain no references to human security, yet if it is conceded that 
dangerous climate change poses a potentially catastrophic threat to future conditions of 
human life, then its framing as a serious challenge to human security seems justifiable. For 
O’Brien et al. (2010, p. 13), this implies a shift of focus from human-induced environmental 
change to what these changes mean for vulnerable individuals and communities. Indeed, 
it is through the lens of climate vulnerability and adaptation that the human security 
concept is gaining currency within the UN climate regime. The UNFCCC requires Parties 
to take into account the needs of particularly vulnerable developing countries in managing 
the adverse effects of climate change, while the Kyoto Protocol provides a financial 
mechanism, the Adaptation Fund, to assist these countries in meeting the costs of climate 
change adaptation. Responsibility to support funding of adaptation in developing countries 
is also enshrined in the 2010 Cancun Agreements, including the allocation of substantial 
new monies through a Green Climate Fund. While these actions are expressed as state 
obligations and entitlements, UNFCCC assistance to developing countries has included 
vulnerability assessments centred on human well-being, gauging local coping strategies 
and adaptive capacity in the context of natural resource-dependent livelihoods (UNFCCC, 
2007, pp. 15-16). 
 
UNFCCC deliberations on climate vulnerability have been significantly shaped by the 
IPCC, especially the contribution of Working Group II (Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability) to successive assessment reports and IPCC-sponsored research on 
adaptation and vulnerability. IPCC framings of vulnerability to climate change have 
increasingly stressed the socioeconomic and political conditions that affect how individuals 
and communities cope with the impacts of climate-related change (Adger, 2006; Leary et 
al. 2008). A concern for the plight of particularly vulnerable populations has invited human 
security concepts and interpretations. Initially these centred on climate variability and 
change impacts on food production, recasting the notion of ‘food security’ as applying to 
households and individuals rather than national agricultural production (Boko et al., 2007, 
pp. 454-56). This concern with food security fed into UNFCCC decision-making on 
adaptation, most recently in the Work Programme on Loss and Damage (Subsidiary Body 
for Implementation, 2011, p. 47). Since 2010 the IPCC has explicitly embraced ideas of 
human security, which can be attributed at least in part to the agenda-setting activities of 
lobbying coalitions (e.g. the Climate Change, Environment and Migration Alliance) and 
epistemic communities (e.g. the Global Environmental Change and Human Security 
Project). By the time of the Fifth Assessment Report, IPCC Working Group II devoted a full 
chapter to human security as a necessary conceptual matrix for understanding the 
differential vulnerability and adaptive capacity of people exposed to climate change. 
 
The invocation of human security in the forthcoming Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC 
may be a necessary step in legitimating the concept for UNFCCC Parties, but as yet it has 
received no policy endorsement within the climate change treaty regime. Climate 
vulnerability and adaptation seem the most likely governance domains to receive such a 
move. In their review of UN funding schemes relevant to climate change adaptation, 
encompassing UNFCCC-managed or mandated funds, McGlynn and Vidaurre (2011) 
observe no references to human security in the terms of reference or guidelines in any of 
these financial instruments. Yet human security analysis has emerged in climate 
adaptation initiatives funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
which is assisting poorer countries in adaptation financing and policy-making. In its 
2007/2008 Human Development Report, UNDP treated climate change as arguably the 
greatest challenge facing global poverty reduction and human development efforts (UNDP, 
2007). Its emphasis on protecting poor and vulnerable households from climate shocks 
resonated with IPCC work on climate vulnerability, and the gravity of dangerous climate 
  
change as an existential threat justified, for UNDP, a human-centred understanding of 
climate insecurity. 
 
To be sure, the UNDP interest in climate change emerged from its own influential 
formulation of human security, broadly defined in the 1994 Human Development Report as 
‘freedom from fear and freedom from want’ then specified as ‘safety from such chronic 
acts as hunger, disease and repression and ...protection from sudden and hurtful 
disruptions in the patterns of daily life - whether in homes, jobs or communities’ (UNDP, 
1994, p. 23). While this human security concept was articulated by a UN body with a 
human development mandate, the global governance domain addressed, even 
challenged, by its construction was the international security system. The timing was 
opportune for its re-definition of security away from state-centred threats and military 
conflicts: a post-war Cold War had opened up discursive space for recognizing multiple, 
inter-related threats to human well-being. For its proponents (e.g. Commission on Human 
Security, 2003; Gasper 2010), the idea of human security exposes the dysfunctionality of 
global security decision-making, tied to national military capacities and technologies: the 
person-centred understanding of human security implies instead a universal or 
cosmopolitan coverage indifferent to state borders. For it critics, by contrast, the concept 
mistakenly retains ‘security’ as a desired end goal, which not surprisingly has resulted in 
its co-option by wielders of political and economic power (e.g. Neocleous, 2008; Turner et 
al., 2011). 
 
The human security concept has acquired significant currency since the mid-1990s. Not 
surprisingly, it has appeared in a range of National Human Development Reports 
sponsored by UNDP, particularly those covering volatile, conflict-prone countries - 
including Afghanistan, East Timor, Iraq and Sierra Leone (Jolly and Basu Ray, 2007; 
UNDP, 2008). Environmental degradation constitutes a separate category of threat to 
human security in UNDP’s 1994 Human Development Report, and features in, for 
example, the national reports for East Timor and Sierra Leone. UNDP embraces a broad 
concept of human security, which corresponds to its usage in the UN system and an 
influential formulation by the Japanese government. However, narrower definitions, which 
are less amenable to environmental threats, have also attracted policy support. For 
example, the Canadian and Norwegian governments interpret human security as 
pertaining only to personal physical security and civil rights (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 
1997, pp. 9-38; Gasper, 2010). 
 
Minimal definitions of human security can exclude climate change damage from their 
purview on account, it is claimed, of the lack of intentionality in climate-induced harm to 
persons (Gasper, 2010, p. 27). There has also been resistance by several UN Security 
Council members - notably China and Russia - to the inclusion of climate change as 
relevant to the Council’s primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and 
security (a proposal raised by the UK during its April 2007 presidency of the Security 
Council). Nevertheless, climate change is now recognised across the UN system as 
posing major challenges both to human and national security. A report issued by the 
Secretary-General in 2009 presented climate change as a threat multiplier, exacerbating 
existing sources of conflict and security (UN Secretary-General, 2009). This statement 
reflected the preference of many Member States to focus on the security of individuals and 
communities, and also for a strengthening of efforts to mainstream climate change within 
the UN (e.g. UN Chief Executives Board for Coordination, 2008). A subsequent report by 
the Secretary-General on human security repeated the claim that climate change, and its 
interactions with other insecurities, represents a serious threat to human lives and 
livelihoods (UN Secretary-General, 2010, p. 12). 
  
 
That the human security concept has some policy traction in the UN system reflects the 
recommendations of a global Commission on Human Security, including its broad 
definition of human security as the protection of fundamental freedoms (Commission on 
Human Security, 2003). One commission proposal led to the creation of an Advisory Board 
on Human Security to advise the UN Secretary-General on the promotion and 
dissemination of the human security concept. Beyond UNDP, human security projects 
have been undertaken by a wide range of UN agencies, including the Office of the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World 
Health Organization and the UN Development Fund for Women (UN Secretary-General 
2010, pp. 2-3). The main dedicated instrument for advancing human security goals is the 
UN Trust Fund for Human Security established in 1999 and managed, since 2004, by a 
Human Security Unit in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 
However, a review of the Trust Fund issued in 2010 by a UN internal audit body noted 
limited buy-in on the part of Member States, with a heavy dependence on financial support 
from the Japanese government. It also expressed concern that there had been no 
comprehensive evaluation of the Fund’s activities in terms of human security outcomes, 
despite financial commitments by 2009 of $355 million (Office of Internal Oversight 
Services, 2010, pp. 3-5). The Human Security Unit at OCHA is ambitiously tasked with 
integrating UN human security activities across all UN activities: obstacles to this 
integration, according to senior UN staff, are thrown up by divergent financial systems and 
mandates, as well as a lack of understanding of the concept by UN Country Teams 
(Advisory Board on Human Security, 2011). 
 
Given this challenging institutional context, it is noteworthy that OCHA is making modest 
progress across the UN system in highlighting climate change as a human security issue. 
Recent (2011-) multi-agency projects approved by the UN Trust for Human Security 
include an FAO-led project to strengthen rural livelihoods severely affected by climate 
change-induced drought in Lesotho and a UNICEF-led project to enhance community 
resilience and coping with climate change and natural disasters in Vanuatu (Human 
Security Unit, 2011, pp. 7-8). More generally, climate change is a thematic priority for 
OCHA and, since December 2008, the agency has led an advocacy campaign to raise 
awareness of the humanitarian implications of climate change. As set out in a 2009 
speech by the UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency 
Relief Coordinator, climate change threatens to overwhelm a global humanitarian system 
designed to respond to trigger events (e.g. natural disasters, conflicts) rather than chronic 
humanitarian needs arising from ‘slow onset’ climate-induced harm. Addressing effectively 
the latter requires, it is claimed, new models of prevention, preparedness and response 
(OCHA 2009, pp. 9-11). 
 
Ironically, by representing climate change as an autonomous driver of humanitarian 
impacts, OCHA has neglected the particular trajectories of climate-related harm 
experienced by civilians in (post)conflict environments - affected communities for whom it 
has an express mandate to assist. Populations facing or recovering from conflict are 
especially vulnerable to climate variability and extremes because of impaired coping 
options and low adaptive capacity (Barnett, 2006; Mason et al., 2011). Scholarly work on 
the relationships between determinants of climate change, human security and conflict 
(e.g. Barnett and Adger 2007; Mason et al. 2012) has raised questions about the 
responsibilities and capabilities of institutional actors - including states, international 
organisations and donors - which have yet to be addressed by UN agencies facing climate 
vulnerability in war-related environments. There are actors and modalities in the UN 
system which could in principle accommodate a human security understanding of climate 
  
(and other environmental) hazards in (post)conflict areas; for example, the post-conflict 
needs assessments undertaken by the UN Environment Programme and an emerging 
concern with environmental stresses in the UN Peacebuilding Commission (Swain and 
Krampe, 2011, pp. 207-208). As yet, though, there is little institutional movement in this 
direction. 
 
It can be concluded, therefore, that despite the embrace of human security by international 
organisations addressing climate change and human development/humanitarian needs, 
there remains no settled global governance space for enhancing human security against 
climate change. That the main impetus for promoting this goal has come from UN bodies 
suggests that the multi-agency funding being facilitated by OCHA’s Human Security Unit is 
the most appropriate instrument for conjoining climate change and human security 
activities - at least within the UN bureaucracy. The ‘mainstreaming’ of human security in 
UN activities is a politically delicate project, deferential to the sovereignty sensitivity of 
those Member States anxious that the concept could be used to justify interventionist 
actions (e.g. under the responsibility to protect norm). The Report on Human Security of 
the Secretary-General asserts that, on the basis of its mandate to address security, 
development and human rights, human security is central to the work of the UN (UN 
Secretary-General, 2010, p. 17); yet at the same time, human security is not presented as 
a strategic priority under the Secretary-General’s Five-Year Action Agenda launched in 
January 2012. This is in contrast to the ‘generational imperative’ of climate change (UN 
Secretary-General, 2012). Similarly, the wave of collaborative governance with non-state 
actors fostered since 1998 by the UN Fund for International Partnerships has generated 
far more funding for environmental (including climate change) projects than those relating 
to peace, security and human rights; in other words, human security-oriented activities are 
also perceived as contentious by many private partners (Andonova, 2010, p. 45).  
 
The ambivalence over human security in UN governance practice, combined with the 
uncertain location of human security in the UN climate change convention, invites a 
normative analysis of what institutional (re)design may be needed to advance more 
effectively the protection of core human values in the context of harmful climate change. 
This is the focus for the second half of this chapter. 
 
 
INTEGRATING HUMAN SECURITY NORMS IN THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF 
CLIMATE HARM 
 
Understanding climate change as an issue of human security represents an explicitly 
normative approach which, according to its proponents, rejects the dominant 
‘environmental’ narrative of climate change. By reifying the environment as an 
independent, naturalised category, governance responses under this mainstream 
perspective are viewed as favouring techno-managerial fixes which preclude questions 
about the moral responsibility and political-economic interests of those who profit most 
from high-carbon development paths. A human security framing is, in contrast, seen as 
opening space for critical reflection on, and policy engagement with, the structural drivers 
of climate vulnerability as they interact with other threats to human well-being (Adger, 
2010; O’Brien et al., 2011, pp. 11-14). The normative intent is both to reveal how climate 
harm is implicated in the creation of particular insecurities faced by vulnerable people and 
how their fundamental freedoms can be protected or even enhanced. 
 
From such a normative perspective, the identification of (potential) harm is pivotal to the 
justification and governance application of human security ideas. As Mike Hulme (2010, 
  
pp. 191-196) argues, the ultimate objective of the UN climate change convention, as 
articulated by Article 2, is usually abbreviated as the avoidance of ‘dangerous climate 
change’; yet such a notion of danger defies easy quantification, exposing the limits of 
scientific risk analysis. Interpretations of danger, he claims, are always context-specific 
and value-laden, because the experience of insecurity only becomes meaningful for 
individuals or groups in particular situations. This experiential realm of harm perception is 
a necessary element for the construction of human security. The additional challenge of 
defining climate danger is that it constitutes an ‘un-situated risk’, with distant, intangible 
sources and diffuse, indirect causes (Hulme, 2009, p. 196). Viewing UNFCCC Article 2 
through the lens of human security would therefore seem to render even more intractable 
the global governance efforts to manage climate risk, as the current and projected 
trajectories of specific harm are too uncertain and imprecise to register in terms of human 
security. 
 
However the tendency to portray dangerous climate change as a governance problem sui 
generis overlooks the international legal architecture in which the UNFCCC is embedded, 
which offers, if not blueprints for collective action, then at least principles to steer 
institutional coordination. Of cardinal relevance to the Article 2 objective to avoid 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system is the harm prevention 
principle recalled in the preamble of the climate change convention: 
 
 States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
 international law, the sovereign right to exploit their resources pursuant to their 
 environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities 
 within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
 States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
 
This paragraph repeats Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, which itself is a slightly amended version of Principle 21 of the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment. Both UN declarative principles codify 
what is widely acknowledged as a general environmental obligation in international law. 
The principle is endorsed, beyond the UNFCCC, in a range of multilateral environmental 
agreements, including treaties addressing air and marine pollution, biodiversity 
conservation, radioactive contamination and desertification. All these legal regimes share 
as their governance problem the prevention and/or mitigation of inadvertent environmental 
harm, usually as a result of behaviour by state or non-state actors otherwise deemed 
permissible. The issue is that the accumulation of harm for vulnerable entities has, for a 
given governance authority, approached or crossed a threshold of unacceptable injury. 
 
Again, the core harm prevention obligation within the climate change convention is 
accorded determinacy by its resonance with a background set of normative expectations in 
international environmental law. A common corollary of the harm prevention principle is the 
legal requirement of due diligence, such that states take all necessary measures as may 
reasonably be expected in all circumstances (Okowa, 2000, p. 81). Due diligence allows a 
consideration of problem-specific and other contextual factors in the application of harm 
prevention rules, tailoring obligations with reference, for example, to historical 
responsibility, state capability and the likelihood or seriousness of danger. The UNFCCC 
famously differentiates responsibilities for tackling climate change and its adverse effects 
in relation to the greater culpability and mitigation capacity of developed country Parties, 
as well as the special needs and circumstances of developing country Parties. These 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ are underpinned by 
an explicit appeal to ‘equity’ (Article 3(i)). Harm prevention obligations in the climate 
change treaty system are also qualified by the adoption of a precautionary principle - that 
  
Parties should take ‘precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes 
of climate change and mitigate its effects’ (Article 3(iii)). As expressed in Principle 15 of the 
Rio Declaration and other multilateral environmental treaties, the intent is to prevent a lack 
of full scientific certainty serving as a justification for postponing cost-effective measures 
designed to prevent serious or irreversible damage as a consequence, in this case, of 
climate change. This principle is not immune for criticism (e.g. Sunstein, 2005), but 
nevertheless is regarded by UNFCCC Parties as a legitimate expression of due diligence 
in negotiations over commitments to avoid dangerous climate change. 
 
The notion of human security invites a reconceptualisation of climate harm prevention from 
the perspective of human safety, well-being and freedom. Neil Adger provides useful 
pointers on applying human security to climate change impacts, highlighting, for example, 
how ‘freedom from want’ could encompass increased resource scarcity caused by 
declining water availability or land productivity, and ‘freedom from fear’ could include risks 
to health or place of residence as a consequence of climate-induced damage (2010, p. 
281). The assessment of climate harm according to human security would, in any given 
context, need to identify both major climate risks and also preventive mechanisms for risk 
avoidance or reduction, while at the same time situating these stresses in relation to other 
sources of human insecurity, Uniting the specification and prioritisation of threats is a 
concern with the vulnerabilities of affected individuals and communities, including their 
capacity to adapt to threats in a way that builds resilience (Adger, 2010). 
 
If, following Adger, we take as a key criterion of human security the protection of the most 
vulnerable people, its institutional application in the UN climate change regime is currently 
constrained by the state-centred formulation of responsibilities and entitlements. As 
already noted, there are express commitments to address the needs of particularly 
vulnerable countries, justified by the principle of differentiated treatment; but the measures 
adopted in practice have not effectively captured unequal vulnerabilities within national 
populations. For example, under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) - one of the 
flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol - there is a problem, first, with the outcomes of 
disbursements to developing country Parties under the Adaptation Fund (mainly financed 
by a 2% levy on Certified Emissions Reductions under the CDM). Level of vulnerability to 
climate change is an important criterion for Adaptation Fund support of adaptation projects 
and programmes in developing countries. Yet McGlynn and Vidaurre (2011) have 
highlighted the relatively modest financing available in relation to the climate adaptation 
needs of target countries and the long-term sustainability of a fund tied to the uncertain 
future of the Kyoto Protocol. Second, in relation to the CDM projects themselves, there is 
no international supervision of the extent to which these address the conditions of the 
most vulnerable: authority on technological and project choices is delegated to host 
countries, who often have recourse to other policy considerations, such as trade and 
investment interests. Moreover, the prominent role of private sector actors in CDM 
projects, and carbon markets more generally, has skewed climate financing away from 
particularly vulnerable groups (Cullet, 2010, pp. 191-192). 
 
Any expectation that the protection of those people most vulnerable to climate change 
harm would find normative support from the commitment to equity in Article 3 of the 
UNFCCC is also frustrated by the consistent expression of this moral principle in terms of 
inter-state relations. To be sure, in this article there is an explicit recognition of inter-
generational equity - that the climate system should be protected for the benefit of both 
present and future generations of humankind. And human security would seem a relevant 
framework for identifying scenarios that pose catastrophic costs to future generations. Yet 
the weighting given to the welfare of future generations is typically interpreted through the 
  
lens of national interests. The present costs of abatement actions presumed to benefit 
future generations usually appear in UNFCCC negotiations in terms of disputed burden-
sharing between developed and developing countries. Similarly, UNFCCC decision-
making on inter-generational equity addresses the costs (and benefits) of mitigation and 
adaptation actions as received by Parties to the climate change convention and Kyoto 
Protocol. There are of course differences over what equity means on practice, including its 
moral kinship to ideas of fairness and justice (see Soltau, 2009), but not over the 
understanding that it applies above all to an interdependent community of sovereign 
states. 
 
While public international law is by definition state-centric, there are multilateral 
instruments which demonstrate that it is indeed possible to prioritise harm protection for 
vulnerable individuals and groups. Andrew Linklater (2011, pp. 36-41) identifies a growing 
cluster of ‘cosmopolitan harm conventions’ designed to protect people from avoidable 
harm regardless of their national citizenship status. With roots in international agreements 
covering the welfare of non-combatants during war, a cosmopolitan regard for protecting 
the vital interests of vulnerable people is now embedded in conventions covering, for 
example, genocide, apartheid, torture and terrorist bombings. Their preoccupation with 
safeguarding the bodily integrity and dignity of human beings in situations of extreme 
danger falls within the moral compass of human security. Recognising that the damage 
caused by climate change is, like other instances of transnational environmental harm, 
distinct from direct forms of violence, its potential for serious injury to people can still justify 
a cosmopolitan construction of harm prevention (Linklater, 2011, p. 39; Mason, 2005, pp. 
69-75). I follow this logic to argue that, given the very limited inroad of human security 
thinking in the UN climate change regime, there is currently more institutional scope for 
addressing the human security effects of climate change by applying rules of conduct 
developed in the fields of (i) human rights governance and (ii) global humanitarian 
governance. 
 
(i) Human rights governance 
The relationship between climate change and human rights has already been examined at 
the UN by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which was 
charged in March 2008 by the UN Human Rights Council with undertaking an analytical 
study of the issue. In its report, OHCHR cautions that climate change effects may not 
necessarily violate human rights, but that human rights obligations still provide important 
protection to individuals whose rights are negatively affected by climate change or 
responses to it. These rights impacts are potentially wide-ranging, though those human 
rights most directly threatened are judged to include rights to life, food, water, health, 
housing and self-determination (OHCHR, 2009, pp. 8-15). Importantly, OHCHR recognises 
that the effects of climate change will be felt most acutely by vulnerable individuals and 
groups, noting that states are already legally bound to address such vulnerabilities in 
accordance with rights instruments promoting equality and non-discrimination (OHCHR, 
2009, p. 15). The report stresses existing governmental duties under international human 
rights law, which encompass national obligations to realise substantive and procedural 
rights, as well as international obligations to cooperate in the promotion and protection of 
human rights. These recommendations have not been ignored: the UN Human Rights 
Council has cited the report in encouraging its expert groups (‘special mandate-holders’) to 
address climate change within their domains of responsibility, and human rights bodies 
now have justification to consider climate change effects within their monitoring remits 
(Knox, 2009, p. 477). Insofar as respect for human rights serves as a benchmark for 
human security, such institutional moves are a necessary step in protecting vulnerable 
people from various trajectories of serious harm as a direct or indirect consequence of 
  
climate change. Of course, they also rely on high levels of human rights protection across 
the international community, which remains an ambitious expectation. 
Human rights governance features standards and instruments for ensuring that those 
breaching human rights are held to account, including the availability of remedies and 
redress for victims. This is arguably the most difficult area for institutionalising the 
protection of vulnerable individuals and groups from climate-induced injury, in part 
because of difficulties attributing harm to particular state or private actors. As an 
application of territorial responsibility, the UNFCCC apportions accountability obligations to 
governments, but the treaty regime does not provide direct remedies to those people 
disproportionately affected by climate harm. In this respect, the climate change convention 
is no different from other multilateral environmental agreements which avoid prescribing 
state liability for actual environmental damage, reflecting the preference of the 
international community for private liability systems (Mason, 2005, pp. 116-119). 
Opportunities are gradually opening up for affected individuals and groups to pursue 
transnational civil litigation against particular state or corporate actors for climate harm. 
Vulnerable communities are often reliant on assistance from external actors to bring such 
actions, which creates an inevitable selectivity in victims represented. Similarly, a reliance 
on diverse domestic systems of liability also limits the exercise of private law remedies to 
particular legal jurisdictions, with the US currently serving as a key testbed for such 
‘climate justice’ actions (Grossman, 2009; Abate, 2010). While an imperfect instrument for 
providing direct remedies to parties facing serious climate harm, tort-based climate 
litigation does highlight an accountability deficit in global climate governance. 
 
(ii) Global humanitarian governance 
Human rights protections are an important element of international assistance dealing with 
the humanitarian consequences of climate-related emergencies. However, humanitarian 
rules comprise a distinctive set of governance policies and instruments, which are 
designed to limit the harm caused by disasters and armed conflict. As such, they prescribe 
assistance for those experiencing particular patterns of human insecurity. Alongside the 
climate change work of OCHA mentioned above, there have been efforts to promote 
global coordination of humanitarian assistance on climate harm through the work of a task 
force on climate change, migration and displacement reporting to an Inter-agency 
Standing Committee of UN and non-UN humanitarian agencies. The focus of the task 
force on climate-induced migration and displacement reveals a high-level humanitarian 
concern about developing coherent, workable rules to meet the challenge of substantial 
numbers of people expected to be displaced or even made stateless by climate change. 
Significantly, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has criticised use of the 
term ‘climate refugees’ to describe such people. fearing that it ‘could potentially undermine 
the international legal regime for the protection of refugees whose rights and obligations 
are quite clearly defined and understood’ (UNHCR, 2009, p. 9). For the same reason, it 
has opposed amending the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 to include 
such displaced persons. Nevertheless, there is growing support for a new legal instrument 
to provide dedicated protection to those suffering involuntary movements due to climate-
related changes (e.g. Docherty and Giannini, 2009; McAdam, 2011). No such assistance 
is set out in the UN climate change treaties, so the most likely domain for developing 
relevant measures is global humanitarian governance. 
 
Concerned as it is with regulating the conduct of armed conflict, international humanitarian 
law is a distinct and essential subset of this governance field. Its broad aim to protect 
individuals and groups from the effects of war finds resonance with those applications of 
the human security concept to (post)conflict areas, as noted above for UNDP Human 
Development Reports. The legal and policy authority of international humanitarian law is of 
  
course far greater than that of human security, but the latter still has value in situations of 
armed conflict by highlighting in a holistic way the compounded stresses (war-related and 
otherwise) faced by vulnerable individuals and groups. This is how a human security 
perspective could identify the direct and indirect relations between conditions of warfare 
and climate vulnerability. Existing humanitarian law includes provisions prohibiting extreme 
and disproportionate damage to the environment by combatants, but is imprecise 
regarding the specific protection and assistance available to civilians whose vulnerability to 
climate harm may be exacerbated by military actors (e.g. severe restrictions in livelihood 
options and personal insecurity). The emerging subdiscipline of ‘warfare ecology’ has 
opened up areas of enquiry looking at the combined biophysical and human effects arising 
from war-related conditions (Machlis et al., 2011). Should this research delineate how 
hostile military forces are accentuating the vulnerability of populations to serious climate 
harm, there will be evidence for arguing that such actions may breach the general duty on 
combatants to protect civilian populations. At the moment, climate change tends to be 
represented as an external variable shaping the long-term environmental conditions for 
people in post-conflict environments (UNEP, 2009, p. 11). A recognition, instead, that 
combatants can intensify the short-term vulnerability of civilians to climate (and other 
environmental) stresses would bring climate-related harm more squarely within the scope 
of international humanitarian rule-making and enforcement. 
 
For global governance concerned with human rights and humanitarian assistance, there 
are existing rules of conduct which, in principle, cover certain expressions or experiences 
of climate harm. This has been acknowledged by lead UN agencies on human rights and 
humanitarian affairs, even if there are also uncertainties about the appropriate governance 
instruments to assist those facing a high risk or incidence of climate-related damage 
affecting their vital freedoms. A fundamental challenge here is a structural mismatch 
between the UN climate change regime and the rights-based global regimes directed at 
the protection of vulnerable human beings. Humphreys captures neatly the systemic 
differences between the two governance domains: 
 
 One [climate change] is a regime of flexibility, compromise, soft principles and differential 
 treatment; the other [human rights] of judiciaries, policing, formal equality and universal 
 truths. Faced with injustice, one regime tends to negotiation, the other to prosecution (2010, 
 pp. 316-317). 
 
The search within human rights and humanitarian governance for remedies available to 
people seriously threatened by climate harm reflects a major accountability deficit in the 
UNFCCC architecture. It is not surprising, therefore, that human security has received 
support as a mediating or bridging concept between these disconnected areas of 
governance - one that highlights the predicament of those most vulnerable to ‘dangerous’ 
climate change. 
 
At the same time, there are also potential pitfalls with such a move. Including climate 
change threats within the purview of human security risks institutional overstretch in what 
is still a nascent, uncertain domain of governance. The expansive take on harm prevention 
provided by human security has unsettled critics of this approach on account of its 
apparent open-endedness (see Jolly and Basu Ray, 2007, pp. 465-466; Gasper, 2010, p. 
40): according policy attention to diffuse climate change effects is unlikely to allay such 
concerns. In operational terms, much will depend, therefore, on ascertaining climate risks 
or harm with enough precision to factor them in when prioritising serious threats to human 
well-being. Here the epistemic authority of the IPCC is likely to be crucial in validating the 
type of climate information deemed credible enough to feature in substantive assessments 
of human security, which would also need to incorporate the bottom-up, experiential 
  
accounts of affected groups. Such assessments may enable the identification of prima 
facie breaches of human rights or humanitarian rules caused by climate-related harm 
largely attributable to the actions or omissions of responsible parties. Reaching this 
(appropriately) high threshold of proof should trigger further investigation by relevant 
monitoring and enforcement bodies within global human rights and humanitarian 
governance. Of course, human security goals are also served by preventative policy 
actions - for example climate adaptation planning to increase the resilience of the most 
vulnerable (Adger and Nelson, 2010). However, mechanisms providing rights-based 
accountability for individuals and groups facing serous climate harm are still rudimentary, 
warranting greater political attention and policy development. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The idea of human security now has significant currency in a range of global policy 
discourses and has received high-level endorsement within the UN system. It is also 
recognised as relevant to the global governance of climate change, most notably in recent 
deliberations by the IPCC and, implicitly, in UNFCCC commitments to prioritise the needs 
of those judged to be most vulnerable to climate-related harm. As noted in this chapter, 
though, there has been no formal declaration on human security by the UNFCCC, so the 
principal international architecture for regulating climate change does not (yet) feature 
dedicated measures for advancing human security as a regime goal. Climate change as a 
threat to human security has instead emerged as a key concern within the human 
development reporting process overseen by UNDP - the agency credited with popularising 
the concept - while the UN has given its lead humanitarian office the strategic 
responsibility for managing climate change projects supported by a human security trust 
fund. Despite statements by the UN Secretary General that climate-induced harm is a 
major source of human insecurity, there remains no settled governance authority for 
enhancing human security against ‘dangerous’ climate change - a situation I labelled 
‘regime indeterminacy’. 
 
In the second half of the chapter I argued that greater governance coherence for this area 
finds normative support from cosmopolitan notions of harm prevention, which universally 
accord moral priority to the protection of people from unnecessary injury. Cosmopolitan 
harm conventions represent the institutionalisation of this perspective: they resonate with 
ideas of human security, but hold greater political and legal force. Interpreting climate 
threats along cosmopolitan lines therefore allows an integration with pre-existing rules of 
conduct relating to the prevention and mitigation of harm for vulnerable individuals and 
groups. At the moment, the clearest expression of such rules is found in international 
regimes concerned with human rights and humanitarian protection. I noted above that 
these regimes feature instruments that could address particular instances of climate-
related harm. While their coverage is necessarily selective, and may not capture all the 
possible human security effects of climate change, the added value of these regimes to 
global climate governance is both a recognition of serious climate-related threats infringing 
on vital human interests and also adjudicatory mechanisms offering rights-based means of 
accountability. The climate harm prevention value of these governance regimes is, 
ironically, more likely to be effective by remaining separate from the UNFCCC until such 
time that its member states commit to compatible human security goals. 
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